Active Shooter – Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack Scenario

Discussion-Based Exercise Development Kit #4

Maritime Incident Preparedness and Response Discussion-Based Exercise Project

STEVENS INSTITUTE of TECHNOLOGY
THE INNOVATION UNIVERSITY

MARITIME SECURITY CENTER
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PROJECT OVERVIEW

The Maritime Security Center (MSC), a DHS Center of Excellence in Maritime and Port Security led by the Stevens Institute of Technology in conjunction with the Stephenson Disaster Management Institute (SDMI) at Louisiana State University has been working to develop scenarios and tabletop exercise resources to enhance the core capabilities and preparedness of port facilities and port operators to an array of hazards, including natural and man-made threats. It is the MSC's intent to extend these resources to the broad spectrum of port partners that comprise the maritime community, including public and private, local, state and Federal organizations. The MSC/SDMI tabletop exercise program builds upon other nationally recognized Executive Education Programs to provide support and resource materials for maritime and port stakeholders to develop and exercise their own tabletop and discussion-based activities.

Prior to the participation and development of any exercise content, staff from MSC and SDMI met with key stakeholders, to include the U.S. Coast Guard, Sector New York and Sector New Orleans, to discuss a range of scenarios that were critical to the ports. Through these dialogues, the two areas of concern that were most commonly identified involved active shooter, with emphasis placed on an event taking place at a cruise terminal, and cyber based intrusions for nefarious purposes. Based on the requirement to develop exercises for these two emerging threats, the initial focus of this initiative has been geared towards developing content that will assist exercise design teams in developing realistic scenarios for active shooter and cybersecurity disruptions. As part of the process of developing content, scenarios and exercises design resources, the SDMI team worked directly with the Port of New Orleans, Port of New York/New Jersey, and the Area Maritime Security Committee for the Gulf of Mexico to develop an active shooter exercise and multiple cyber based exercises. Content from these exercises, as well as additional content, has been developed by an SDMI working group consisting of emergency managers, cyber experts, port officials, and Master Exercise Practitioners to provide a series of exercise scenarios to be used by ports and their tenants to test core capabilities related to active shooter and cyber threats.

The final year of this project has focused on integrating the lessons learned from the development and design of five separate exercises into the design and deployment of an "Exercise-in-a-Box" development kit to be leveraged by port affiliated exercise design teams. The purpose of the exercise development kits is to assist and enable other ports and USCG Sectors to customize and conduct their own discussion-based exercises focused on responding to active shooter and cyber based threats. The complete series of exercise scenarios can be found on the MSC website at:

https://www.stevens.edu/research-entrepreneurship/research-centers-labs/maritime-security-center/education-training/tabletop-exercise-development-kits.

Overview of the Exercise Design Kit

The active shooter discussion based exercise development kit is designed to provide a series of four active shooter scenarios that will allow members of the maritime community to develop an exercise scenario based on their current capabilities to respond to an active shooter event. Each of the scenarios build upon the first scenario and introduce a greater element of complexity to an active shooter response. The intent is to allow ports to take a crawl, walk, run approach in their efforts to build an enhanced capability in responding to an active shooter event.

All four exercise scenarios are built around four modules. The first module is the "Threat Awareness" module, and is designed to facilitate discussion around existing security postures and how participants would respond if there was a specific threat indicator that would raise awareness of a potential active shooter event. The second module is the "Pre-Incident / Incident" module, in which the players are introduced to either a precursor of a pending active shooter event or the initiating element of an active shooter event. The purpose of the "Pre-Incident / Incident" module is to initiate discussion on what protocols exist when an active shooter indicator is present and the initial response once an active shooter event is initiated. Module three is the "Escalation" module, in which the active shooter event reaches its apex, and is designed to illicit discussion on a comprehensive response to an active shooter event. The final module is the "Post-Event" module, which is meant to allow the participants to discuss how an active shooter event within or near their facility may change their security posture and screening efforts moving forward.

With the intent to provide the exercise design team with a full range of active shooter based scenarios, this exercise design series consists of four different aspects of an active shooter scenario. The four modules are based on the following potential scenarios: 1) An active shooter that involves a disgruntled employee; 2) an active shooter that involves a domestic dispute in or near a cruise terminal; 3) a lone wolf terrorist attack at an active cruise terminal; 4) a complex coordinated terrorist attack at a cruise terminal. The first module is intentionally designed to allow the exercise design team to take place within any facility located in a port. The remaining three modules are specifically designed to test a response at a soft target at the port that allows unfettered access to or near the intended target. These modules are meant to be used individually based on the current capabilities of a port system, or to be conducted as two or more exercises that allow a port system to establish a foundation on their overall response capabilities, with the ability to add more complexity and challenges to a significantly more difficult scenario.

This development kit is meant to serve as a resource to help the exercise support team design most aspects of an actual discussion based exercise. This kit was designed based on guidelines established by the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP). In addition, the development kit includes scenarios that will provide an opportunity for the Captain of the Port to raise the MARSEC level for the port, a specific industry within the port, or a specific operation within the port to ensure facilities can meet their annual reporting requirements to exercise their Facility Security Plan.

Resources of the Exercise Design Kit

Each exercise development kit includes the following resources:

1) **List of Potential Players and Observers** – Based on experiences with the exercises that were developed as part of this project, a matrix is provided that identifies potential participants and observers for each of the scenarios. This is not a complete list and should not be used to preclude an important player within a port. This list serves as a guide on potential agencies that would have an important capability / responsibility in an active shooter event. Also, based on location, some of the listed participants may not have a capability within a specific port that would be able to influence an actual response. Participants are listed by agency and not individual components within a specific agency. It's important for the exercise design team to recognize some recommended agencies may have more than one entity that should be at the table. For example, local law enforcement should include the specific law enforcement district that has jurisdictional authority; however, if the law enforcement element has a Special Reaction Team, someone from the team should also be included.

2) **Core Capability Alignment** – DHS/FEMA has published a list of 32 core capabilities. While all core capabilities may not be completely relevant to an active shooter, there are quite a few that are applicable. As part of the development kit, we are providing a list of core capabilities that are aligned to an active shooter event within the port system. In addition, some of the identified core capabilities may only align to a more complex active shooter event and may not be relevant to a single shooter. Each of the scenarios has specific core capabilities that are more closely aligned with that scenario.

3) **Recommended Objectives** – For each of the relevant core capabilities, we have also identified potential / sample objectives that can be leveraged for the actual exercise. These objectives are intentionally written in a way that is generic and not specific to any particular participant or process being evaluated in an exercise. If the exercise design team identifies objectives that are relevant to their exercise, they can use as is or add more clarity and specificity to each of the relevant objectives.

4) **Scenario Builder** – The scenario builder provides four injects for each of the four modules. The multiple injects allow the exercise design team to take different routes for an active shooter event while increasing the overall level of complexity, or simplifying the event if the exercise participants have minimal capacity to effectively respond to an active shooter scenario. The injects can be used as they are currently written, or the exercise design team can add more specific information to the inject, such as a specific location / building in which the injects would actually occur. Modifying the injects to fit a specific facility will add to the realism of the exercise.

5) **Facilitator Guide** – The facilitator guide identifies questions that a facilitator can use during the actual exercise. While the list of questions is not a complete list of all potential questions, it represents a significant starting point that can be leveraged to help in the process of completing the desired questions that will ultimately be used during the execution of the exercise.

LIST OF POTENTIAL PLAYERS AND OBSERVERS

This section contains a list of recommended participants and observers that should be considered in developing an invite list for the actual exercise. Ultimately, it is up to the exercise support team to determine who should actually be a participant/observer. Some of these agencies should also be considered when developing the exercise support team. When warranted, clarification for each of the listed agencies is provided. Included with the recommended participants is a complete list of recommended roles for all four active shooter modules.

Participants:

Port Administration: Included among the Port Administration should be some representing the C-Suite to include Operations, as well as the Port Facility Security Officer.

Port Police

Port Facilities: Facilities meeting the requirement to have an FSO should be considered. Due to the significant nature of the type event, other tenants should also be included.

U.S. Coast Guard Sector: Participants should consider including the Captain of the Port (or designee), Port Security Specialist, and a uniformed member from Contingency Planning and Response.

Local Homeland Security / Emergency Preparedness Office

Local Police Department: Participants should consider inviting the district with jurisdictional authority, a headquarters element, and a representative from the Special Reaction Team.

Local EMS

Local Fire Representative

State Police / State Patrol: Consider including representatives from the local troop, headquarters, and Crisis Response / Special Reaction Team.

State Homeland Security / Emergency Preparedness Office

State Fusion Center

Cruise Lines: Many cruise lines hire contractors to conduct their screening at the terminal. Someone representing the contractor and a representative of the cruise line should be considered.

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Customs Border and Patrol (CBP): Depending on the time of the day, Customs and Border Patrol are likely to have agents at the terminal. CBP agents are there to screen passengers going through the disembarkation process. In most cases, CBP agents will be the only armed law enforcement that is actually operating within the terminal.

National Guard: At a minimum, participants should include someone from the State Headquarters' Joint Directorate of Military Support to Civilian Authorities (JDOMS). In addition to a JDOMS representative, someone from the HQ's Joint Directorate for Operations should be considered as well as any post commander in the immediate vicinity of the port. Finally, all 50 states have a Civil Support Team, and a representative from this team should be included as well.

Joint Terrorism Task Force (members beyond the FBI): While the FBI's JTTF lead will most likely already be involved, there are many other representatives of the JTTF that should be considered, especially if they are active in information and intelligence sharing. Consult with the FBI JTTF

DHS Protective Services: The DHS Protective Services representative will already be familiar with most port operations. They serve as a conduit in relaying information on the status of affected infrastructure.

FEMA Region Representative: For a terrorist attack, local and state resources may get exhausted. Having a FEMA representative from Operations and Preparedness would be beneficial.

Immigration and Customs Enforcement: In addition to having a role in Customs, ICE also has specialized response teams that may be within the vicinity of a port facility. For a major attack, they could prove to be a beneficial resource.

U.S. Marshalls: In addition to their normal law enforcement role, the U.S. Marshall services also have specialized teams that could be called upon to deploy in a terrorist attack.

Participant / Observer Matrix

Participant	Scenario 1: Disgruntled Employee		Scenario 2: Domestic Dispute		Scenario 3: Lone Wolf Attack		Scenario 4: Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack	
	Player	Observer	Player	Observer	Player	Observer	Player	Observer
Port Administration	X		X		X		X	
Port Police	X		X		X		X	
Port Facilities	X		X		X		X	
Facility FSO	X		X		X		X	
Coast Guard	X		X		X		X	
Local Homeland Security / Emergency Management	X		X		X		X	
State Homeland Security / Emergency Management		X	X		X		X	
Local EMS	X		X		X		X	
Local Fire	X		X		X		X	
State Fusion Center		X	X		X		X	
National Guard		X		X	X		X	
State Police / State Patrol	X		X		X		X	
Cruise Lines		X	X		X		X	
FBI		X	X		X		X	
Joint Terrorism Task Force		X		X	X		X	
Customs Border and Patrol		X	X		X		X	
DHS Protective Services		X		X	X		X	
FEMA Region		X		X	X		X	
Immigration and Customs Enforcement		X		X	X		X	
US Marshalls		X		X	X		X	

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CORE CAPABILITY ALIGNMENT

The Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) calls for the identification of core capabilities to be exercised during a discussion based exercise at the beginning of the design process. Ideally, initial guidance should be provided by port officials, Captain of the Port, or facility decision makers on essential components and identified priorities that serve as the focus of the exercise. Once priorities are established, identification of core capabilities to meet the initial guidance is important to develop relevant objectives that are nested with the chosen core capabilities. The following core capabilities have been identified as having the most applicability for an active shooter event based on a domestic incident taking place in or near a cruise terminal. Prior to moving forward with the exercise design, the exercise support team should review the full list of all 32 core capabilities to determine if there are others core capabilities they may want to integrate in the design. To ensure the exercise focuses on specific capabilities, the exercise support team should select three or four of the core capabilities to be assessed in the exercise.

Intelligence and Information Sharing
Provide timely, accurate, and actionable information resulting from the planning, direction, collection, exploitation, processing, analysis, production, dissemination, evaluation, and feedback of available information concerning threats to the United States, its people, property, or interests; the development, proliferation, or use of WMDs; or any other matter bearing on U.S. national homeland security by Federal, state, local and other stakeholders. Information sharing is the ability to exchange intelligence, information, data, or knowledge among Federal, state, local, or private sector entities as appropriate.

Risk Management
Identify, assess, and prioritize risks to inform Protection activities and investments.

Physical Protective Measures
Reduce or mitigate risks, including actions targeted at threats, and/or consequences, by controlling movement and protecting borders, critical infrastructure, and the homeland.

On-scene Security and Protection
Ensure a safe and secure environment through law enforcement and related security and protection operations for people and communities located within affected areas, and also for all traditional and atypical response personnel engaged in lifesaving and life-sustaining operations.

Operational Coordination
Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities.

Operational Communications
Ensure the capacity for timely communications in support of security, situational awareness, and operations by any and all means available, among and between affected communities in the impact area and all response forces.

Situational Awareness
Provide all decision makers with decision-relevant information regarding the nature and extent of the hazard, any cascading effects, and the status of the response.

Fatality Management Services
Provide fatality management services, including body recovery and victim identification, working with state and local authorities to provide temporary mortuary solutions, sharing information with mass care services for the purpose of reunifying family members and caregivers with missing persons / remains, and providing counseling to the bereaved.

Economic Recovery
Return economic and business activities (including food and agriculture) to a healthy state, and develop new business and employment opportunities that result in a sustainable and economically viable community.

The following table provides a complete list of all capabilities that are associated with the full complement of active shooter scenarios:

Core Capability Alignment

Disgruntled Employee	Domestic Incident	Lone Wolf	Coordinated Attack
• On Scene Security, Protection and Law Enforcement • Risk Management for Protection Programs and Program Activities • Physical Protection Measures • Operational Coordination • Operational Communications • Situational Awareness	• On Scene Security, Protection and Law Enforcement • Risk Management for Protection Programs and Program Activities • Physical Protection Measures • Operational Coordination • Operational Communications • Situational Awareness	• Intelligence and Information Sharing • On Scene Security, Protection and Law Enforcement • Risk Management for Protection Programs and Program Activities • Physical Protection Measures • Operational Communications • Operational Coordination • Situational Awareness • Fatality Management • Economic Recovery	• Intelligence and Information Sharing • On Scene Security, Protection and Law Enforcement • Risk Management for Protection Programs and Program Activities • Physical Protection Measures • Operational Communications • Operational Coordination • Situational Awareness • Fatality Management • Economic Recovery

RECOMMENDED OBJECTIVES

The following objectives are meant to serve as a guide for the exercise support team to consider in developing objectives. By no means are the suggested objectives a complete list of potential objectives. The objectives are intentionally written not to be specific to any port or facility. When considering the following objectives, the exercise support team should modify to fit their own needs and, if desired, identify specific facilities or elements within the port system that make the objectives specific to the agencies/facilities participating in the exercise.

1) **Intelligence and Information Sharing**

   Objective 1a: Validate how the Port Enterprise System conducts intelligence and information sharing once an increase in security posture has been recommended by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) due to an increased likelihood of a pending terrorist attack on an unknown target.

   Objective 1b: Identify strengths, gaps, and needs in the intelligence and information sharing environment in the Port of New Orleans.

   Objective 1c: Assess the ability of the state / local fusion center to disseminate intelligence throughout the Port System with emphasis on private sector facilities.

   Objective 1d: Assess the ability of local public safety officials to provide intelligence to the fusion center during an active event.

   Objective 1e: Assess the ability of private sector entities to provide threat intelligence to local first responders.

2) **Risk Management:**

   Objective 2a: Identify areas of improvement for the emergency management / risk management program.

   Objective 2b: Determine if the current Facility Security Plan is sufficient to prepare for and respond to an active shooter event.

   Objective 2c: Determine if the facilities current threat assessment is sufficient to respond to an active shooter.

   Objective 2d: Determine if the active shooter hazard is properly prioritized within the current risk management framework for the facility.

3) Physical Protection Measures:

Objective 3a: Assess the effectiveness of current protective measures to protect the work force from an active shooter event.

Objective 3b: Determine the readiness level of security personnel to adequately respond to an active shooter event.

Objective 3c: Examine if the current preparedness level of the workforce is sufficient to provide immediate life-saving actions for the current workforce during an active shooter event.

Objective 3d: Determine if current plans and protocols are sufficient to protect the lives of employees and passengers in the event of an active shooter within the cruise terminal.

4) On-Scene Security and Protection:

Objective 4a: Identify ways to improve safety and security of port facilities and operations during emergency events.

Objective 4b: Determine if there are any gaps in the current security force to properly secure port facilities during an active shooter event.

Objective 4c: Determine effectiveness of the current security force to integrate with local public safety entities to provide enhanced security for the port facility.

Objective 4d: Assess the ability of current plans to protect employees and passengers during an event that would require an immediate evacuation of the terminal.

Objective 4e: Determine the effectiveness of port, local, state, and Federal officials to work together in an unfamiliar environment to secure and protect a cruise terminal following an active shooter event.

5) Operational Coordination:

Objective 5a: Examine the operational coordination requirements between the local, state, and Federal first responder agencies in response to an active shooter event at a cruise terminal.

Objective 5b: Enhance the ability of the port / facility leaders and decision makers to respond to a major emergency or disaster.

Objective 5c: Examine the limits of mutual aid, with the intent to determine the capabilities of the port to respond to an event absent of substantial and immediate assistance.

Objective 5d: Develop a common understanding of key homeland security policies, emergency management strategies, authorities, plans, and organizational structure.

Objective 5e: Identify gaps and needs in the command and control structure of disaster response.

6) Operational Communications:

Objective 6a: Determine the ability and effectiveness of integrating disparate radio systems between port, port tenants, and local first responders.

Objective 6b: Determine the ability of first responder agencies to establish a communication plan that utilizes appropriate talk groups on a shared radio system.

Objective 6c: Determine the best way to establish voice communications with affected port facility.

Objective 6d: Establish secondary and tertiary means of communications between affected port facility.

7) Situational Awareness:

Objective 7a: Determine the effectiveness of port officials / port facilities to share information and provide situational awareness to local first responders.

Objective 7b: Determine the effectiveness of port officials / local first responders to develop situational awareness of an active shooter event at a port facility.

Objective 7c: Determine the effectiveness of port officials / local first responders to monitor social media to enhance situational awareness of an escalating event at a port facility.

Objective 7d: Determine if notification systems are sufficient to alert the port system of an immediate active shooter threat.

8) Fatality Management Services

Objective 8a: Determine if there are any gaps in the state and/or local fatality management plan.

Objective 8b: Determine if the state and/or local Mass Fatality Plan is properly resources to respond to a mass fatality event.

Objective 8c: Determine the minimal threshold that is needed to activate the mass fatality plan.

Objective 8d: Determine the best methods for providing information to the public during a mass fatality event.

Objective 8e: Determine the best way to obtain reliable ante-mortem data.

Objective 8f: Assess the Mass Fatality Plan's procedures and resource requirements to establish a Family Assistance Center.

9) Economic Recovery

Objective 9a: Identify potential fallouts from a terrorist attack on a port facility and the sequence of actions to mitigate impacts and ensure the port is able to fully recover economically.

Objective 9b: Determine whether or not the port's Continuity of Operations Plan is adequate in dealing with a terrorist related event at a port facility.

Objective 9c: Assess the ports / cruise line recovery plan to determine if it is sufficient in addressing potential fallout from a terrorist attack on a port facility.

SCENARIO BUILDER

The active shooter scenarios are designed around four modules: Module 1 – Threat Awareness; Module 2 – Pre-Incident / Incident; Module 3 – Incident Escalation; Module 4 – Post-Incident. For each module, multiple injects are provided to allow the exercise support team to develop an exercise that meets the team's specific goals and objectives. The exercise support team can pick and choose the injects in any combination that ultimately facilitates the assessment of objectives that are agreed upon for their specific exercise. When deciding on which injects to use, designers are encouraged to change elements of the injects, such as specific location, terminal name in which the event occurs, to add realism.

The overall scenario of a complex coordinated terrorist attack is based on a small team of four individuals wishing to inflict terror by forcing a disruption to a major leisure activity enjoyed by many in the United States. The shooters desire is to inflict as many casualties as possible. The overall purpose of this scenario is to introduce a scenario that requires the engagement of state and Federal resources in order to bring resolution to the event. The scenario was developed by combining recent terrorist attacks at the Brussels International Airport in April 2016 and the Paris Batacian theatre in November 2015.

The injects of Module 1 and 2 are independent of the injects in Module 3 and 4. Module 2 provides two injects that initiate the terrorist attack. Unlike the previous active shooter scenarios, there is not an inject that serves a pre-incident indicator. Because an event like this would take significant planning, an assumption is made that the attackers are able to initiate the attack without providing any advanced warning. Injects 2a and 2b are essentially the same; however, they occur at different times of the day which accounts for a different dynamic in the terminal at the time of the shooting. Module 3 and 4 includes two injects with inject 3a and 4a linked to one another as is inject 3b and 4b. The 3b and 4b injects are very similar to inject 3a and 4a; however, they provide a bit more complexity by including rumored gunshots at an additional terminal as well as being a more significant mass casualty event.

Module 1 – Threat Awareness

The first module, Threat Awareness, is designed to explore the current security posture and risk management framework currently employed within a cruise terminal. The intent of the first inject is to raise awareness that the potential threat of violence exists and discuss the possibilities that a cruise terminal's security posture may be modified because of the threat. This module is also designed to assess the ability of Federal, state, and local intelligence gathering assets to share information across the port system. Injects 1a and 1b are general, with no specific threat to the cruise terminal. Inject 1a is based on widely reported terrorist propaganda on social media threatening to target the United States and actual terrorist attacks in Europe. Inject 1b is the actual release of an Elevated Alert through the National Terrorism Advisory System that indicates that the maritime transportation sector could be targeted.

Module 1 (Threat Awareness) - Core Capability Alignment:

Information and Intelligence Sharing

Risk Management

Physical Protective Measures

On Scene Security and Protection

Module 1 (Threat Awareness) Injects:

Inject 1a: CNN is reporting that after recent ISIS claimed successful terrorist attacks in Europe, ISIS has released several online videos and posts throughout social media indicating they have issued instructions to followers in the United States to immediately begin conducting attacks that disrupt the daily operations of the American people. While the Department of Homeland Security has no credible evidence of an imminent attack, they have warned public safety officials to be extra vigilant and report anything out of the ordinary to their local law enforcement or state / local fusion centers.

Inject 1b: On _____ the Department of Homeland Security has issued an Elevated Alert through the National Terrorism Advisory System. The Elevated Alert provides a warning to law enforcement officials about potential terrorist activity directed specifically towards the maritime and aviation transportation sector.

Module 2 – Pre-Incident / Incident

The second module, Pre-Incident / Incident, provides varying levels of complexity and information available to the participants. The goal of Inject 2 is to assess the ability of a port to provide an initial response to a potential or actual active shooter event. Inject 2a is a no notice active shooter event taking place at the screening location where there are typically no law enforcement officials within sight. Inject 2b offers a little more complexity by having an active shooter event initiate with no notice and taking place earlier in the day while the disembarkation process is still ongoing. Both injects assume that the shooters purchased tickets for the cruise and are able to easily get past the initial screener into the terminal with weapons being transported in their luggage.

Module 2 (Pre-Incident / Incident) – Core Capability Alignment:

Operational Coordination

Operational Communications

Module 2 (Pre-Incident / Incident) Injects:

Inject 2a: Approximately two hours prior to the cruise ship's departure, a large explosion takes place in the parking garage. Almost immediately after, continuous gunfire erupts in the screening area of the cruise terminal. Pandemonium ensues and passengers in the screening area, along with those already screened in the waiting area, begin racing to all available exits of the facility.

Inject 2b: Approximately six hours prior to the cruise ship's departure, a large explosion takes place in the parking garage. Almost immediately after, continuous gunfire erupts in the screening area of the cruise terminal. Pandemonium ensues and passengers in the screening area, along with those already screened in the waiting area, begin racing to all available exits of the facility. The situation is compounded as disembarkation from the previous cruise is ongoing.

Module 3 – Event Escalation

The Event Escalation module provides the participants the opportunity to discuss how they would engage in a coordinated response within the terminal, and coordinate between the cruise line and law enforcement at all levels of government. This module is designed to explore the operational coordination and operational communication issues between the facility and responding public safety officials. Each inject offers an additional element of complexity in coordinating the response. Injects 3a and 3b build upon Injects 2a and 2b respectively by providing law enforcement with a little more intelligence about the shooter and the outcome. Inject 2a provides law enforcement with less information about the immediate location of the shooters. Inject 2b introduces two variations to the scenario by having shooters enter a fixed location with passengers who may not be able to escape, thus adding the element of a potential hostage situation. In addition, Inject 3b also introduces the possibility of the shooters carrying an active explosives vest. Inject 3b also adds a complication by inserting potential gunfire at an adjacent cruise terminal.

Module 3 (Escalation) – Core Capability Alignment:

Operational Coordination

Operational Communications

Situational Awareness

Module 3 (Escalation) – Injects:

Inject 3a: Passengers fleeing the terminal report 3 to 5 gunman pulled out assault weapons from their luggage and began shooting indiscriminately at passengers and

screeners. They stated they were casualties everywhere. Employees from the cruise line reported the shooters were moving throughout the terminal, randomly engaging targets. At least two witnesses believed they saw suicide vests on two of the gunman.

Inject 3b: Passengers fleeing the terminal report 3 to 5 gunman pulled out assault weapons from their luggage and began shooting indiscriminately at passengers and screeners. They stated they were casualties everywhere. Employees from the cruise line reported the shooters were moving throughout the terminal, randomly engaging targets. At least two witnesses believed they saw suicide vests on two of the gunman.

The shooters were last observed on security cameras moving passengers into the VIP room before the cameras were disabled by the shooters. Gunfire can still be heard coming from inside the terminal.

Within ten minutes of the initial explosion and gunfire, reports of gunfire are beginning to come in from passengers at an adjacent terminal to the terminal currently under attack.

Module 4 – Post Incident

The purpose of Module 4 – Post Incident, is to bring a conclusion to the immediate threat and facilitate discussion about the immediate and long-term recovery from an active shooter, as well as discuss impacts on the overall security posture of a cruise terminal post-active shooter event. The discussion for Module 4 is designed to include the requirements of dealing with a mass fatality event once the threat has been neutralized. In addition, it is meant to refocus on the initial core capabilities dealing with Risk Management, Physical Protective Measures, and On-Scene Security. Finally, Module 4 also offers an opportunity to discuss how the port / cruise line recovers from a major terrorist event. Inject 4a is linked to inject 3a and concludes with the shooters being terminated by law enforcement. Inject 4b builds upon Inject 3b, with two of the shooters neutralized by law enforcement and the remaining two detonating a suicide vest inflicting additional casualties. Inject 4b is also designed to escalate the potential for a mass casualty event.

Module 4 (Post Incident) – Core Capability Alignment:

Risk Management

Physical Protective Measures

On Scene Security and Protection

Fatality Management Services

Economic Recovery

Module 4 (Post Incident) – Injects:

Inject 4a: Law enforcement officials terminate four shooters after making a tactical entry into the cruise terminal. Law enforcement officials are reporting at least twelve casualties in the screening area and additional five casualties in the waiting area. The cruise terminal has been reported clear of shooters; however, the search for secondary explosives is ongoing.

Inject 4b: Law enforcement officials terminate two of the shooters after making a tactical entry into the cruise terminal. Two other shooters detonated their suicide vests in the VIP area before they could be neutralized by law enforcement personnel. The cruise terminal has been reported clear of shooters; however, the search for secondary explosives is ongoing. Law enforcement is reporting sixteen casualties requiring varying degrees of medical attention. They are also reporting at least four victims who appear to be dead, After clearing the VIP area, law enforcement reports at least fourteen deaths and twenty two additional casualties.

The adjacent terminal has been cleared and reports of gunfire in the terminal are determined to be false.

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FACILITATOR GUIDE

One of the most important aspects of any discussion based exercise is the development of a comprehensive script for the facilitator. This part of the development kit is designed to provide a framework in which any exercise support team can establish an initial foundation of relevant questions for a facilitator to ask during the actual delivery of the exercise. The questions are organized by module and by core capability. The Facilitator Guide is not a complete list of all relevant questions. These questions are general, and are meant to apply to any participant of a facility. When designing the final bank of questions, the exercise support team should include questions that are based on actual security policies and procedures, the Facility Security Plan, and other relevant sources that are specific to the port community. Once the specific core capabilities for an exercise are settled upon, the exercise support team should review some of the questions from the other core capabilities as they may be loosely related to other capabilities not selected for the exercise.

At the conclusion of this section, the full exercise script that was used for the delivery of an active shooter event for the Port of New Orleans is provided as a guide on how to fully develop a facilitator script. One aspect that will be noticed in the New Orleans script is that the scenarios are not included in the script. To add realism to the New Orleans exercise, LSU's Manship School of Mass Communications was used to develop actual news clips to facilitate the discussion. The news clips very closely follow the final injects that are available in the Complex Coordinated Terrorism Attack Exercise Development Kit.

Questions for Inject 1 – Threat Awareness

Core Capability: Information and Intelligence Sharing

1. How does threat information get disseminated to the Port Enterprise System?

2. From a regional perspective, how does the intelligence process work – Federal, state, and local flow of information? Is there too much reliance on the Federal government to take the lead on Intelligence?

3. Describe the Intelligence Fusion system in your state and your city and how information is shared with the port.

4. What process is used to collect, fuse, analyze, and disseminate intelligence and information products? What is the status of intelligence and information fusion efforts? Is it meeting your expectations?

5. Should all disciplines be involved? How are public health and other agencies incorporated into the intelligence collection, analysis / fusion, dissemination, and feedback process? Are there any policy or operational considerations?
6. How should regional entities be involved in intelligence sharing / collaboration?

7. What role does / should the private sector play in intelligence strategies? Are private sector entities within the port system getting access to information? How is it disseminated?

8. Are there any issues regarding legal authorities / statutory limitations to gather intelligence and share it with law enforcement – e.g. open meeting/disclosure laws, etc.?

9. Do you expect information and intelligence to be shared regionally?

10. Who should drive or determine the end products of the fusion process? What do elected officials expect as end products for their consumption?

Core Capability: Risk Management

1. Are employees trained on how to respond to an active shooter event?

2. Does your facility have an active shooter plan in place? Are there safe spaces for employees, passengers?

3. How often does your facility conduct risk assessments and what is the process for conducting the assessment?

4. How do you prioritize your risk? Where does active shooter fall on this list?

5. Based on recent news events, is your threat for active shooter where it needs to be?

6. At this time, what resources are made available for employees from a training and response perspective? What about post event? For how long are these resources available?

7. Do altercations between passengers sometimes occur? How are they handled?

8. Has a cruise terminal ever had to be evacuated during an embarkation or disembarkation process?

9. Do current events involving terrorism overseas affect the risk management process? What if they begin to become more prevalent here in the United States?

10. What are the greatest threats to the local port community?

11. How should responsibilities be set for threat identification - federal, state, or local governments? The cruise line industry? Who should be involved and/or excluded and why? Which agencies are responsible now?

12. How is the Federal government organized to identify threat? Is it meeting expectations?

13. What are the policy challenges associated with threat identification? Can or should they be addressed?

Core Capability: Physical Protective Measures

1. Based on the NTAS alert / Recent Events / Social Media publications, are you changing your security posture for your facility?

2. Would the Captain of the Port consider changing the MARSEC level based on an alert that indicates the maritime and air transportation sectors may be targeted?

3. If so, what MARSEC level would be considered?

4. What is the current screening process for passengers to enter the terminal? Are screeners trained on how to deal with an aggressive passenger with a weapon?

5. Are there any procedures to spot check passengers entering the terminal to see if they may have a weapon?

6. What is the current throughput of passengers through a normal situation with the full screening process?

Core Capability: On Scene Security and Protection

1. What are your current security protective measures?

2. What are normal day to day security levels?

3. At what point is the security level raised? Who makes this decision? Who is the decision shared with internally and externally?

4. Is the Coast Guard notified? If so, when?

5. What are your current on-site physical security capabilities? Are your security forces armed? Are they internal or contracted?

6. Is any of this information shared with other port partners?

7. Does the facility have a mechanism to share "Be On the Look Out" for potential hostile threats? How is this information disseminated? Is it shared with other port facilities? Is it shared with the port? If notified, would the port disseminate to other port facilities?

Questions for Inject 2 – Pre-Incident / Incident

Core Capability: On Scene Security and Protection

1. How would you handle a concerned family notifying the cruise line that a passenger may be in danger? How are you able to locate the passenger? If they hadn't checked in, would you attempt to call them and explain what has happened?

2. Would the notification of this passenger being endangered, how would you alter current screening criteria? Would you alter it? Would the information be shared with local law enforcement? Would the information be shared with the Coast Guard? What about the law enforcement detail providing traffic control? Would this alter your normal throughput for screening?

3. Would you add security inside the terminal? Would you add security at the initial checkpoint?

4. Would the facility make any changes to its security posture?

5. Would this information be shared with adjacent facilities? Port authorities? Would the Coast Guard be notified? If so, who specifically would be notified? Who would make the notification?

6. Is there any type of dedicated information sharing capability within the port?

7. Assuming a passenger was able to bring a weapon into the facility, what would be the procedure if someone observed a passenger walking throughout the terminal openly carrying a firearm?

8. Would internal security respond? Would local law enforcement be notified or asked to intervene? Are there enough local law enforcement personnel providing traffic control to respond to an incident without negatively impacting the traffic flow?

9. Would the passenger be detained? Questioned? What is the existing protocol in dealing with this type of event?

10. Would this be handled with internal resources, or would external resources be required?

11. How do you handle personnel in adjacent facilities? Would an order to evacuate or shelter in place be given? Who makes that decision?

12. Many ports have more than one cruise terminal that may be loading at the same time? What do you do with the passengers in an adjacent terminal? Who makes that decision?

Core Capability: Operational Coordination

1. What is the current protocol in responding to actual gunshots in the terminal? Are personnel properly trained to respond?

2. Who would be notified? How would they be notified?

3. How long would it take for additional local law enforcement to realistically reach the scene? What about a specialized team such as a Special Response Team (SRT)?

4. In addition to law enforcement, who else would respond?

5. Who has overall authority to manage an active shooter event that is believed to be initiated by a passenger?

6. What is the Coast Guard's role in an event like this?

7. Are there existing relationships with local law enforcement and the port facilities?

8. Are local law enforcement personnel familiar with the layout of the terminal?

9. In this scenario, the event initially appears to be an act of terrorism; how does that change the response? Does it change who is in charge of the response? Who has ultimate authority?

10. How would a major and catastrophic incident in the Port be managed and coordinated?

11. Has sufficient training been provided and required to ensure employees with disaster responsibilities are equipped to undertake assigned duties? Has coordinated training between federal, state, and local law enforcement taken place for a major terrorist event? Have security personnel from the cruise lines been integrated into training?

Core Capability: Operational Communications

1. Does the facility have the ability to communicate directly with law enforcement on secure voice networks?

2. What types of communication capabilities are available to the port tenants? Does the cruise line security staff have the ability to directly communication with local / port law enforcement?

3. Does the FSO have the ability to communicate directly with law enforcement outside of a cell phone or land line?

4. Can the FSO communicate directly with the port or Coast Guard?

5. Would other port facilities be notified of this event? How would they be notified?

6. How does the port communicate with law enforcement? The Coast Guard?

7. Is there a shared radio system that the port and local first responders use? If yes, are there common talk groups?

8. Do policies exists that determine how the radio system is used during an emergency? Are the first responders aware of these policies? Do they know how to properly execute the policies during an emergency?

9. Are there disparate systems between port and local public safety? Does the capability to bridge disparate radio systems exists? Do the agencies that have the bridging capability have personnel that are properly trained on bridging disparate radio systems?

10. How will interoperable communications be achieved between various response organizations and agencies? Are the cruise lines included in some fashion? Are current systems survivable?

Questions for Inject 3 – Incident Escalation

Core Capability: Operational Coordination

1. What authorities can force closures of facilities? To what extent do closures take place?

2. Would this scenario result in the closing of any port facilities?

3. Would an active shooter event at a port facility have any impact on maritime traffic? Who would make that decision?

4. Would the waterway immediately adjacent to the affected terminal be impacted?

5. What considerations would be taken in making the decision to adjust traffic?

6. Would state and federal law enforcement be requested at this point or would it be contained at the local level and those immediately on scene?

7. Do security personnel at port facilities have sufficient training to respond to an active shooter at the facility?

8. Has local security trained on integrating with local law enforcement?

9. Are the port facilities familiar with the Incident Command System (ICS)? The cruise line staff?

10. Do they know their role in the ICS during an active shooter event?

11. Have they actively practiced implanting ICS for any disaster?

12. How would the Port assess and summarize the status of familiarity and use of the Incident Command System to organize response to a disaster? What are the gaps and needs in implementation and use of ICS?

13. Are the basic priorities of ICS – Life Safety, Incident Stabilization, and Property Conservation – integrated into the planning, logistics, operations, and administrative functions of ICS response?

14. Has ICS been used to coordinate multi-jurisdictional response and management of a disaster in the port?

15. Would a unified command be established or would this be managed by local / port law enforcement?

16. What is the experience of the port and mutual aid jurisdictions in implementing Unified Command to address the three ICS priorities of Life Safety, Incident Stabilization, and Property Conservation?

17. What needs to be done to further improve the understanding and implementation of ICS and Unified Command in the port?

18. What is the status of National Incident Management System (NIMS) certification level training in the Port? Is it accepted as a workable and necessary system?

19. What impact does the shooter carrying an explosive vest have on the response?

20. Is it protocol for law enforcement to assume that the shooter is carrying explosives?

21. What impact does the potential for a shooting somewhere else in the port taking place have on the response?

22. Are there sufficient resources available to clear two separate terminals?

23. With the event escalating, does it have any impact on MARSEC levels? If so, how long would the MARSEC level be raised?

24. What is the Coast Guard doing at this point?

25. What is the role of the Coast Guard for an on shore active shooter event?

26. Who would be handling media requests? Local law enforcement? Affected facility? Elected official? Port?

27. Would a Joint Information Center be established? If so, who would take lead?

28. What requests should officials anticipate from the media?

29. How should the media be engaged to reduce uneasiness / fear?

30. How should preparedness and prevention information be communicated to the public?

31. How do we "talk" about our vulnerabilities to the public?

32. How do you expect to deal with special populations (cultural / language / ethnic, schools, elderly and homebound citizens)?

33. What would be the public's expectation for information and guidance before, during, and after an incident?

34. How can you resolve the risk of the media reporting sensitive security information related to potential terrorist targets?

35. What information should be released to the public? Who decides? What type of discussion occurs when deciding what to say and who will say it?

36. How will the media react? What public information strategies should officials employ?

37. At what point should Federal, state, and local governments engage in pointed and assertive public communications regarding the potential consequences / impacts of an impending disaster? How should the message be coordinated?

38. At what point should Federal, state and local governments confirm to the public that an event is terrorist in nature? How should this message be coordinated?

39. A complex multi-jurisdictional crisis creates a risk of multiple, conflicting presentations of vital information, both internally and externally. What is the structure of Joint Information? How is it triggered? Who's in charge?

40. What is the role of Joint Information Systems / Centers (JIS / JIC) and how should Federal, state, county / urban area JICs be coordinated? Should the cruise lines be incorporated into the JIC?

41. Who would be the spokesperson(s) for response operations?

42. What would be the public's expectations for information and guidance? Before, during and after?

43. Should your strategy for public communications consider enlisting the public's support in both preparing for and responding to a disaster incident?

44. Where would the public go for their information? Are there many hubs of information and how are they linked to ensure consistent massaging?

45. How is social media utilized in the port?

Core Capability: Operational Communications

1. Who is responsible for establishing a communication plan?

2. Do any of the local first responder agencies / USCG have communication leaders / communication technicians on staff and trained?

3. How are notifications and updates being shared with port tenants? Who is notifying the port executive authorities and when does this occur?

4. When is local emergency management / homeland security notified?

Core Capability: Situational Awareness

1. How does the cruise staff relay intelligence information to external stakeholders?

2. How is the information being distributed to responding agencies?

3. Who would be responsible for painting the big picture?

4. What resources are available to help do that?

5. Is your PIO or communications representative notified? At what point?

Questions for Inject 4 – Post Incident

Core Capability: Risk Management

1. Having gone through an active shooter event, how does this impact your existing threat assessment?

2. Does this event change the way you prioritize your risk?

3. Based on this scenario, do you believe your threat for active shooter is where it needs to be?

4. From a recovery perspective, what resources are made available for employees at this point in time? For what length of time are these resources available? Do you have existing relationships with mental health providers?

Core Capability: Physical Protective Measures

1. If the assailant is still on the loose, what impact does it have on any consideration to adjusting MARSEC levels?

2. How would the adjacent facilities handle a potential active shooter on the port system? How are they being notified?

3. Do you believe your current policies and security postures are sufficient to protect against a potential domestic dispute incident becoming an active shooter?

4. What adjustments do you think need to be made to your Facility Security Plan to accommodate for an active shooter? What training do you think you will need for your security personnel, your normal workforce?

5. What type of impact does this have on the embarkation and disembarkation process of the cruise industry? What changes would federal agencies make to their current processes?

6. Would this change the security posture at screening areas? Would you anticipate that a more visible law enforcement presence would be expected?

7. Would the cruise industry reassess their screening process? Possible do screening off site and move the screened passengers to the terminal?

Core Capability: On Scene Security and Protection

1. Now that you have gone through an active shooter scenario, do you believe your security posture and policies are sufficient to respond to an active shooter event?

2. What adjustments do you think need to be made? Any policies that need to be reviewed?

3. Do your currently security levels allow you to sufficiently ramp up if there is an active shooter in your facility?

4. Are your current notification procedures of adjacent facilities, port officials, and USCG sufficient to ensure timely notification of an active shooter event in your facility?

5. Are local first responders adequately familiar with your facility?

Core Capability: Fatality Management Services

1. Do you have a Fatality Management Plan?

2. How do you handle next of kin notification?

3. Do you have a family / employee reunification center identified if needed?

4. What resources do you have available for employees (grief, crisis counseling etc.)?

5. Are you able to surge primary care physicians? What is the legal authority to do so?

6. What is your morgue capacity in the event of mass fatality event?

7. Do you know how to request a DMORT?

8. What are the protocols to get the facility back to normal operations?

9. Do you have any crisis leave policies for employees directly impacted?

Core Capability: Economic Recovery

1. What is the process for moving from response to recovery and standing down deployed measures?

2. What are the unique concerns in the recovery phase for a catastrophic event? What are the implications on the cruise industry for the port and the industry as a whole?

3. In an event like this, is it reasonable that the Captain of the Port would close the port? If so, how long do you anticipate the port would be closed?

4. How long do you believe the cruise terminal would be closed? What kind of impact having the cruise terminal close have on the port? What does that mean for local industry outside the port?

5. Would there be any negative consequences for other industries in the port?

6. Does the port have a Recovery Plan that addresses business disruptions within the port? Does it include a potential shut down of the cruise industry?

7. Once the cruise lines re-open, how to you get passengers back to the port? How do you regain their trust?

8. If the port has multiple cruise lines, does the have an operational impact on the cruise lines not directly affected? Does the Captain of the Port include them in any potential closure of the active cruise terminal?

Sample Exercise Outline / Script

LSU STEPHENSON DISASTER MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE

MARITIME SECURITY CENTER
A DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER OF EXCELLENCE

Port of New Orleans Discussion-Based Exercise

Conducted by the Stephenson Disaster Management Institute at Louisiana State University and the Maritime Security Center, Stevens Institute of Technology, New Jersey.

"Response to and Recovery from an Active Shooter Event"

Port of New Orleans
June 8, 2016
8:30 a.m. – 12:00 p.m.

Discussion Outline and Key Questions

Preface to the Discussion Outline: The Discussion Outline was developed as a tool to facilitate dialogue among the exercise participants and serve as a resource for follow-on exercises and future training opportunities. The list of questions and observations throughout the outline are intended to aid the exercise participants, and to serve as topics for consideration and conversation in exploring additional issues that may arise as the result of an active shooter event.

9:00 a.m.

Welcoming and Opening Remarks

Brant Mitchell, Director SDMI

Program Purpose

The Maritime Security Center a DHS Center of Excellence in Maritime and Port Security in conjunction with SDMI is working to develop scenarios and tabletop exercise resources to enhance the core capabilities and preparedness of port facilities and port operators to an array of hazards, including natural and man-made threats. It is our intent to extend these resources to the broad spectrum of port partners that comprise the maritime community, including public and private, local, state and Federal organizations. The MSC/SDMI tabletop exercise program builds upon other nationally recognized Executive Education Programs to provide support and resource materials for maritime and port stakeholders to develop and exercise their own tabletop and discussion-based activities.

This material is based upon work supported by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security under Cooperative Agreement No. 2014-ST-061-ML0001.

Maritime Security Center 8 June 2016

Program Objectives

- Identify and examine homeland security challenges in the maritime space and enhance preparedness, response and mitigation efforts through exercising core capabilities
- Discuss potential options to meet homeland security challenges in practical and sustainable ways.
- Integrate lessons learned in the development and execution of this event to facilitate the creation of tools and resources for future discussion-based exercises.
- Identify recommendations for follow-on action by exercise participants.

Agenda Review

- *Under the Agenda Tab in participants handouts*

Event Format

- Interactive roundtable discussion.
- Video scenarios will be used to help frame issues.
- We want to explore unique emergency management challenges and issues at the federal, state and local level. Particularly we want to understand the coordination issues between responding agencies and avoid tactical details.
- It is OK to debate current policies and each other.
- Primary focus will be on intergovernmental and private sector challenges as well as some of the unique response and recovery elements in a catastrophic scenario.

Introductions

- Introduction of the Port of New Orleans Exercise Participants
- Introduction of Panel Members and Event Facilitator

9:10 a.m.

Event Objectives and Key Questions

Stan McKinney, Event Facilitator

Port of New Orleans Primary Objectives:

Core Capability: Intelligence and Information Sharing

Objective 1: Validate how the Port Enterprise System conducts intelligence and information sharing once an increase in security posture has been recommended by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) due to an increased likelihood of a pending terrorist attack on an unknown target.

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Core Capability: Operational Coordination

Objective 2: Examine the operational coordination requirements between federal, state and local first responder agencies in response to a terrorist attack on a land based port facility.

Core Capability: Economic Recovery

Objective 3 Identify potential fallouts from a terrorist attack on a port facility and the sequence of actions to mitigate impacts and ensure the port is able to fully recover economically

Port of New Orleans Secondary Objectives:

Core Capability: Intelligence and Information Sharing

- Identify strengths, gaps and needs in the intelligence and information sharing environment in the Port of New Orleans.

Core Capability: Operational Coordination

- Enhance the ability of the Port of New Orleans leaders and decision makers to respond to a major emergency or disaster
- Identify ways to improve safety and security of port facilities and operations during emergency events.
- Examine the limitations of mutual aid, with the intent to determine the capabilities of the Port of New Orleans to respond to an event absent of substantial and immediate assistance.
- Develop a common understanding of key homeland security policies, emergency management strategies, authorities, plans and organizational structure.
- Identify areas of improvement for the emergency management program.
- Identify gaps and needs in the command and control structure of disaster response. Examine the ways to minimize consequences and impacts of an attack on the Port of New Orleans.

Core Capability: Economic Recovery

- Examine the threats and impacts of an asymmetric attack to the Port of New Orleans.

Key Questions

The overarching exercise questions.

- What are the unique challenges to responding to an active shooter at the Port of New Orleans?
- How does threat information get disseminated to the Port enterprise system?

- Who is the agency/person responsible for the overall coordination and response to an ongoing active shooter event?
- How is the strategic planning process undertaken in the Port of New Orleans? How are homeland security and emergency management integrated into this process?
- What authorities and plans are in place to support effective preparedness, prevention, response and recovery?
- What is the role of the senior leadership in protecting port operations and setting the stage for expedient and efficient recovery? Does the current organizational structure effectively support that process?
- How informed and engaged are governmental leaders and personnel in prevention and preparedness? The private sector?
- What is the process to comprehensively identify and prioritize the risks to homeland security in the Port of New Orleans, through examining vulnerabilities, consequences and threats?
- How do we understand the executive level decision-making process as it pertains to prevention of, preparedness for, and response and recovery to a catastrophe – natural, accidental or human caused – in the Port of New Orleans?
- What do we understand to be the strengths and limitations of external support to the Port of New Orleans in the event of a catastrophe?

9:20 a.m.

Opening Conversation

What are the priority risks and threats as perceived by the Port of New Orleans leadership? What are the major consequences of an Active Shooter event that keeps you up at night?

9:30 a.m.

Core Capability Focus Area: Intelligence Fusion and Information Sharing

VIDEO INJECT 1- PORT OF NEW ORLEANS VIDEO ONE – INTEL BULLETIN

Components of Information Sharing and Fusion Collaboration and how they work.

General overview:

- From a regional perspective, how does the intelligence process work – federal, state, and local flow of information? Is there too much reliance on the federal government to take the lead on Intelligence?
- Describe the Intelligence Fusion system in Louisiana and the City of New Orleans to include the Port of New Orleans.

- What process is used to collect, fuse, analyze, and disseminate intelligence and info products? What is the status of intelligence and information fusion efforts? Is it meeting your expectations?
- Should all disciplines be involved? How are public health and other agencies incorporated into the intelligence collection, analysis/fusion, dissemination and feedback process? Are there any policy or operational considerations?
- How should regional entities be involved in intelligence sharing/collaboration?
- What role does/should the private sector play in intelligence strategies? Are private sector entities within the port system getting access to information? How is it disseminated?
- Are there any issues regarding legal authorities/statutory limitations to gather intelligence and share it with law enforcement – e.g. open meeting/disclosure laws, etc.?
- Do you expect information and intelligence to be shared regionally?
- Who should drive or determine the end products of the fusion process? What do elected officials expect as end products for their consumption?

Threat:

***Next we will examine the general theories and realities concerning threats, concluding with a threat overview** for this exercise.*

Threat Discussion – Port of New Orleans Specific

- What are the greatest threats to the local port community?
- How should responsibilities be set for threat identification - federal, state, or local governments? The cruise line industry? Who should be involved and/or excluded and why? Which agencies are responsible now?
- How is the federal government organized to identify threat? Is it meeting expectations?
- What are the policy challenges associated with threat identification? Can or should they be addressed?

9:50 a.m.

Current Threat Overview Brief

Steve Sin, Study of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism (START)

University of Maryland

Maritime Security Center 8 June 2016

10:00 a.m.

Core Capability Focus Area: Operational Coordination

Authorities and Capacities

VIDEO INJECT 2 - PORT OF NEW ORLEANS VIDEO TWO – BREAKING NEWS

The Structure of Disaster Response in the Port of New Orleans: ICS, NIMS and Unified Command

This aspect of the exercise will focus upon creating a baseline understanding of the system of incident management and coordination in the Port of New Orleans. Focal points will include the Incident Command System (ICS) and its relationship to Unified Command and Policy – Level Decision Making

Key Questions: Authorities and Capacities

- How would a major and catastrophic incident in the Port of New Orleans be managed and coordinated?
- What are the authorities who can force closure of facilities? To what extent do closures take place?
- What considerations are given to closure of the river? If closed, for how long?
- How will state and federal law enforcement resources be requested and how will they be engaged in a major active shooter event?
- Has sufficient training been provided and required to ensure employees with disaster responsibilities are equipped to undertake assigned duties? Has coordinated training between federal, state and local law enforcement taken place for a major terrorist event? Have security personnel from the cruise lines been integrated into training?
- What law enforcement resources are available to assist in the response? What are realistic response times before those resources could arrive at the scene?
- Are adequate logistics management plans and systems in place to support catastrophic disaster requirements?
- How will interoperable communications be achieved between various response organizations and agencies? Are the cruise lines included in some fashion? Are current systems survivable?
- What are the expected roles of various agencies in preparedness? How is this communicated within the port community? What is the expected role of the cruise lines in preparedness?
- Is the process and system of emergency coordination at the policy level well understood? What needs to be done to ensure a common understanding of roles and responsibilities during a crisis?

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10:15 a.m.

Core Capability Focus Area: Operational Coordination

Incident and Unified Command

At this point in the scenario, the Subject Matter Panel will lead and participate in a an examination of the principles and implementation of the Incident Command System (ICS), with specific focus given to multi-jurisdictional operations and Unified Command

Key Questions: Incident Management and ICS

The panel will focus upon a priority topic: The use of Incident Command as an organizing principle for all phases of response to a disaster.

- How would the Port of New Orleans assess and summarize the status of familiarity and use of the Incident Command System to organize response to a disaster? What are the gaps and needs in implementation and use of ICS?
- Are the basic priorities of ICS – Life Safety, Incident Stabilization, and Property Conservation – integrated into the planning, logistics, operations and administrative functions of ICS response?
- Has ICS been used to coordinate multi-jurisdictional response and management of a disaster in the Port of New Orleans?
- Is there understanding and experience in the implementation of Unified Command both internal to the port departments and disciplines, and mutual aid assets?
- In particular, what is the experience of the Port of New Orleans and mutual aid jurisdictions in implementing Unified Command to address the three ICS priorities of Life Safety, Incident Stabilization and Property Conservation?
- What needs to be done to further improve the understanding and implementation of ICS and Unified Command in the Port of New Orleans?
- What is the status of National Incident Management System (NIMS) certification level training in the Port of New Orleans? Is it accepted as a workable and necessary system?

10:30 a.m. Break

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10:45 a.m.

Core Capability Focus Area: Operational Coordination

Asymmetric Attacks

Examination of the Principles of "Asymmetric Warfare"

Opening Discussion – The basic theory is that asymmetric attacks, as distinguished from "linear warfare" are characterized by a weaker adversary enlisting surprise, unpredictability and the exploitation of vulnerabilities against "stronger" adversaries. Simply put, the objective of an asymmetric attack is to require the defending force to expend its resources to the point of being disabled, and out of all proportion to the resource expenditure of the attacking force.

Key Questions and Issues Concerning Response to Asymmetric Attacks:

- The process of identifying infrastructure and system vulnerabilities underpins the planning process to address asymmetric attacks. In a real sense, the same methodologies as those used in the Risk Assessment process are applicable in this specialized strategic and tactical arena. The additional process of attempting to identify which targets are proximate to one another, accessible by foot or other transportation medium, and which have additional attractive components (population density, multiple targets in one attack, etc) is part of the analytical process.
- The ability of the intelligence fusion system to quickly analyze and share situational awareness of unfolding asymmetric attacks is key to both response and stabilization of the disaster. The intelligence fusion system should be assessed for its capacity to support the command and control efforts in the context of an asymmetric attack or series of attacks.
- It is problematic to over-rely upon the ICS structure in the initial response to asymmetric attacks. The most applicable model for response is the "active shooter" model, which –ideally – is supported by special operations, namely counter snipers, bomb squad and emergency medical support properly protected by SWAT or other special ops assets.

11:00 a.m.

Core Capability Focus Area: Operational Coordination

Internal, External

Internal, External Communications and Media Considerations:

- What requests should officials anticipate from the media?
- How should the media be engaged to reduce uneasiness/fear?
- How should preparedness and prevention information be communicated to the public?
- How do we "talk" about our vulnerabilities to the public?
- How do you expect to deal with special populations (cultural/language/ethnic, schools, elderly and homebound citizens)?

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- What would be the public's expectation for information and guidance before, during and after an incident?
- How can you resolve the risk of the media reporting sensitive security information related to potential terrorist targets?
- What information should be released to the public? Who decides? What type of discussion occurs when deciding what to say and who will say it?
- How will the media react? What public information strategies should officials employ?
- At what point should federal, state and local governments engage in pointed and assertive public communications regarding the potential consequences/impacts of an impending disaster? How should the message be coordinated?
- At what point should federal, state and local governments confirm to the public that an event is terrorist in nature? How should this message be coordinated?
- A complex multi-jurisdictional crisis creates a risk of multiple, conflicting presentation of vital information both internally and externally. What is the structure of Joint Information? How is it triggered? Who's in charge?
- What is the role of Joint Information Systems/Centers (JIS/JIC) and how should federal, state, county/urban area JICs be coordinated? Should the cruise lines be incorporated into the JIC?
- Who would be the spokesperson(s) for response operations?
- What would be the public's expectations for information and guidance? Before, during and after?
- Should your strategy for public communications consider enlisting the public's support in both preparing for and responding to a disaster incident?
- Where would the public go for their information? Are there many hubs of information and how are they linked to ensure consistent massaging?
- How is social media utilized in the Port of New Orleans?

11:20 a.m.

Core Capability Focus Area: Economic Recovery

Recovery and Resiliency

VIDEO INJECT 3 - PORT OF NEW ORLEANS VIDEO THREE – LONG TERM CONSEQUENCES

This section of the exercise will build upon the earlier discussions on Intelligence Sharing and Operational Coordination to include Recovery and Resiliency.

Recovery and Resiliency

Resilience is a relatively new concept in DHS' official lexicon and is used more frequently in national policy guidance and strategies. Among the Port of New Orleans participants, is resilience a new concept and what does it mean for you?

- The National Preparedness Goal proposes that we prepare along five mission areas: Prevention, Protection, Mitigation, Response, and Recovery. Is this approach consistent with your jurisdiction's efforts? Why or why not?
- What type of strategic direction do these ideas provide to you, and how do they overlap with resilience?
- What do officials expect to have in place in order to accomplish all of these elements? Is this "idealistic" or "realistic?"
- What policies, structures and/or resources are necessary to accomplish this type of systematic approach?
- Is it realistic to expect your jurisdiction to accomplish all of these elements alone? How can they be resourced?
- What is the process for moving from response to recovery and standing down deployed measures?
- What are the unique concerns in the recovery phase for a catastrophic event?
- What are the implications on the cruise industry for the Port of New Orleans and the industry as a whole?
- What type of impact does this have on the embarkation and disembarkation process of the cruise industry? What changes would federal agencies make to their current processes?

  Does the Coast Guard change the security posture of its MARSEC level? Does this extent to other Ports? If elevated, how long is a reasonable duration for an increased security posture?

11:45 a.m.

Summary

At this point, the discussion will revisit the key question, **What are the major consequences of an Active Shooter event that keeps you up at night?** *Do critical areas need further conversation?*

This begins a comprehensive examination of the key points discerned during the seminar, with a view towards identifying next steps.

Summary Discussion and Next Steps

- The summary of today's discussion will be a collective effort.
- Three questions to consider:

  - What were the most significant issues and/or points of discussion from this exercise?
  - Was there anything you wanted to say, but didn't have an opportunity or that was not covered in the discussion?
  - What should be the top priorities for future efforts in the Port of New Orleans? Immediate? Next several months? Years?
- How has your understanding of key homeland security policies and emergency management strategies changed?
- How will your leadership review authorities, plans and organizational structure in coming months or years? What outcomes would you like to see?
- Which areas of the emergency management program could be improved in the future?
- Has the placement of catastrophic disaster planning in your list of priorities changed at all based on today's discussion?
- Subject Matter Panel closing comments

Closing Comments

- Stephenson Disaster Management Institute (Brant Mitchell)
- The Port of New Orleans Leadership

12:00 p.m.

Adjournment